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SKYJACKING AND THE BONN DECLARATION OF 1978:
SANCTIONS APPLICABLE TO RECALCITRANT
NATIONS
On July 14, 1978, at a high-level summit meeting in Bonn,
West Germany, leaders from seven industrialized countries pro-

duced a declaration aimed at eliminating sanctuaries for skyjackers.' The declaration called for the imposition of an aircraft
boycott against any state that refuses to extradite or prosecute
skyjackers.2 As an international effort to deter skyjacking it is
unique, because it focuses exclusively on the acts or omissions of

nations.
Skyjacking is an offense against the right of civilized people to
be secure from fear, violence, and unlawful deprivation of liberty
while traveling by air. It is a crime that burdens international civil
aviation and causes tension between nations. In essence, skyjacking is an offense against international public order.3 There is a
pressing need to establish more rigorous legal means to deter this
offense. The elimination of sanctuaries for skyjackers is crucial to
the fulfillment of that need.
International measures have largely failed to deter skyjacking.4
International conventions addressing the offense do not set forth
standards for sentencing convicted skyjackers. 5 In addition, the
1. Bonn Declaration on Hijacking of 1978 (copy on file with the Caliornia Western
InternationalLaw Journal),reportedin IndustrializedNations Conclude Anti-HijackingAgreement, 15 WORLD JURIST 8 (July-Aug. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Bonn Declaration]. The
Declaration was set forth on July 17, 1978, at the European Economic Community (EEC)
Summit, Bonn, Germany; source: United States Department of State. There is no record
available on the discussions that precipitated the Declaration. The Bonn Declaration is set
out in full in the text accompanying note 125 infra.
2. Bonn Declaration, supra note 1.
3. See Whiteman, Jus Cogens in InternationalLaw, With a Projected List, 7 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 609, 625 (1977).
4. Abramovsky, Multilateral Conventionsfor the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure and
Interference with Aircraft, Part 111 The Legality and PoliticalFeasibilityof a MultilateralAir
Security Enforcement Convention, 14 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 451, 452 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Abramovsky (pt. 3)].
5. Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, done Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219. See Fitzgerald, Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft: The Tokyo Convention of
1963, 2 CAN. Y.B. INT'L 191 (1964). Fitzgerald states:
The Tokyo Convention is intended to achieve two main objectives: (I) to ensure
that, in the case of offenses against penal law committed on board aircraft, there
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conventions are silent regarding the treatment of political refugees,
who comprise a significant segment of skyjackers. The continued
recognition of political refugees' rights as being paramount has lim-6
ited the effectiveness of international measures to deter skyjacking.
In practice, political refugees are virtually immune to extradition,
and prosecution generally results in light sentences.7 International
terrorists are another favored kind of skyjacker. They often receive
political asylum and reward rather than punishment for their criminal acts.8
The essential point to consider is that skyjackings continue to
occur, and the threat of additional occurrences is evident in light of
the increasing number of coordinated terrorist activities worldwide.9 Although considerable efforts have been made to eradicate
will always be a jurisdiction (namely, the state of registration of the aircraft) in
which a suspected offender may be tried, and (2) to authorize the aircraft commander and other specified persons to take certain steps, including the imposition
of measures of restraint, in relation to persons who commit or are about to commit
on board the aircraft an offense or act which jeopardizes the safety of the aircraft,
or of persons and property therein.
Id. at 192. Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done
Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192, reprinted in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 133
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Hague Convention]. See Abramovsky, Multilateral Conventions
for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure and Interference with Aircraft, Part P" The Hague
Convention, 13 COLUM. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 381 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Abramovsky (pt.
1)].
The Hague Convention has been codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1472(n)(l)(A) & (B) (1976).
Sentencing provisions are included therein:
Whoever aboard an aircraft in flight outside the special aircraft jurisdiction of the
United States commits "an offense," as defined in the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, and is afterward found in the United States
shall be punished
(A) by imprisonment for not less than 20 years; or
(B) if the death of another person results from the commission of the offense,
by death or by imprisonment for life.
Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570, reprinted in 10 INT'L LEGAL
MATS. 1151 (1971). The Montreal Convention sets forth procedures for dealing with alleged
perpetrators of unlawful acts that interfere with civil aviation - for example, saboteurs and does not deal with skyjacking per se. See Abramovsky, MultilateralConventionsfor the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure and Interference With Aircraft, Part11 The MontrealConvention, 14 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 268 (1975). See Abramovsky (pt. 3), supra note 4.
6. These rights flow from the widely ratified Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, done July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6250, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, modified,
1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 [hereinafter cited as Refugee Convention].
7. West German courts have generally sentenced East European skyjackers to terms of
from two to four years. Trimborn, Bonn's Handlingof East Bloc Skyjackers Criticized,L.A.
Times, Oct. 3, 1978, pt. I, at 16, col. 1.
8. Arab terrorists were rewarded by Syria and Algeria for activities involving skyjacking. See Abramovsky (pt. 1),
supra note 5, at 383.
9. For a statistical analysis of the fact that "from 1968 on, hijacking evolved into the
weapon, or the platform, of persons acting for 'public' or political reasons, and has been
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skyjacking on national" ° and international"' levels, none have effectively dealt with the problem of states systematically giving refuge
12
to skyjackers.
This Comment will examine the need for international sanctions to discourage states from providing sanctuaries for skyjackers
and the effectiveness of existing sanctions in fulfilling the global
desire to eradicate skyjacking. The lack of international sentencing
standards will be discussed as a fundamental obstacle to the effectuation of that goal.
As background to this discussion, the provisions of the Hague
Convention of 1970,13 pertaining to the prosecution, punishment,
and extradition of skyjackers, will be analyzed. This will be contrasted with the limitations on enforcement of those provisions imposed by the Protocol to the Refugee Convention,' 4 which
mandates that signatory states grant asylum to political refugees.
Particular attention will be given to the "political offense" ' and the
"political refugee"' 6 exceptions to extradition agreements, insofar
as they pose a substantial barrier to the eradication of skyjacking.
Following the discussion of the Hague Convention, this Comment will examine the Bonn Declaration on Hijacking, 17 the most
recent formulation of international sanctions to deter states from
refusing to extradite or prosecute skyjackers. This section will include a justification for the application of these sanctions to nonparty states of the Bonn Declaration and the feasibility of the
enforcement of the sanctions. In conclusion, this Comment will
suggest that mandatory sentencing standards be adopted and implemented to enforce the sanctions in the Bonn Declaration so that
skyjacking will effectively be deterred.
largely successful in terms of the perpetrators' goals; for example, between 1968 and 1973,
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) have, via skyjacking, obtained the
release of 78 of their comrades," see Evans, Aircraft Skyjacking; What is Being Done, 67 AM.
J. INT'L L. 641, 644-46 (1973). See Sterling, The Terrorist Network, THE ATLANTIC, Nov.
1978, at 37, for a broad analysis of the increased coordination, sophistication, and effectiveness of worldwide terrorist activities.
10. Eg, 49 U.S.C. § 147 2(n)(i)(A) & (B) (1976), set forth, in part, at note 5 supra.
!I. Montreal, Hague, and Tokyo Conventions, supra note 5.
12. Abramovsky (pt. 3), supra note 4.
13. Hague Convention, supra note 5.
14. Refugee Convention, supra note 6.
15. See text accompanying notes 39-62 infra.
16. See text accompanying notes 63-79 infra.
17. Bonn Declaration, supra note 1.
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THE HAGUE CONVENTION

In response to the sharp increase of skyjackings in 1968 and
1969,1 s and the lack of effective deterrent measures, 9 the Council
of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) conducted
a study in 1970 of the skyjacking problem."0 This effort produced
what was to be the framework for the Hague Convention.2 The
purpose of the Hague Convention was to deter skyjacking by assuring punishment for any person committing the act.2 2 The language
of the Convention, however, implicitly betrays this purpose by not
mandating prosecution of alleged offenders.2 3
A.

The Host State's Alternatives." Extradite or Submit to
Prosecution

The Convention appears to require rigorous treatment of alleged offenders. Article 7 provides a mandatory procedure:
The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged,
without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offense was
committed in its territory, to submit the case to its competent
authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those authorities
shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any
24
ordinary offense of a serious nature under the law of that State.
This Article and the entire Convention are binding upon all signatories by virtue of the rule of general international law pacta sunt
servanda.25 Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
18. See Evans, supra note 9, at 643, for a discussion of total worldwide skyjackings:
from 1961 through 1967, there were 31; in 1968, there were 31; and in 1969, there were 88.
19. Hearings on Resolutions Concerning Aircraft HiIacking and Related Matters Before
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1970).
20. ICAO Ass. Res. A16-37, ICAO Doc. 8779, at 92 (1968) called for the Council to
conduct the study.
21. Hague Convention, supra note 5.
22. The preamble, in part, states that "for the purpose of deterring such acts, there is an
urgent need to provide appropriate measures for punishment of offenders." Article I defines
the "offense":
Any person who on board an aircraft in flight: (a) unlawfully, by force or threat
thereof, or by any other form of intimidation, seizes, or exercises control of, that
aircraft, or attempts to perform any such act, or (b) is an accomplice of a person
who performs or attempts to perform any such act commits an offense.
Id.
23. Contra, Comment, Skyjacking and Refugees- The Effect of the Hague Convention
Upon Asylum, 16 HARV. INT'L L.J. 93, 97 (1975).
24. Hague Convention, supra note 5.
25. The rule pacta sunt servanda literally translated means "contracts (treaties) are to be
kept." G. SCHWARZENBERGER & E. BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 564 (6th

ed. 1976).
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Treaties in regard to this rule states that "[elvery treaty in force is
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in
good faith." 26 The essence of pacta sunt servanda is that treaties
have binding force between signatories and create law which must
be observed. This means that "the treaty is or creates a norm establishing obligations and rights of the contracting parties."2 7
According to the terms of Article 7, a party to the Hague Convention must, therefore, either extradite or subject an alleged
skyjacker to prosecution. It has been suggested that the language of
Article 7 obligates a signatory state, absent extradition, to prosecute
an alleged offender without consideration of motive.2 8 A more precise interpretation would be that there is only the obligation of
presenting the case to the appropriate authorities who then decide
whether or not to prosecute. 29 The only legal consequences a
skyjacker can expect now is arrest; punishment and extradition
(usually to the illegally seized aircraft's state of registration) are
mere possibilities.30 Prosecution of offenders frequently results in
relatively light sentences, 3' a practice
that flows from the Conven32
tion's ambiguous penalty provision.
B.

Prosecutionand Non-deterrent Punishment

Even assuming the mandatory prosecution interpretation is
correct, the deterrent effect of punishment is largely nullified by the
ambiguity of the Hague Convention's penalty provision: "Each
contracting state undertakes to make the offense punishable by severepenalties." 3 On its face, this article seems to obligate a signa26. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, openedfor signature, May 23, 1969,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, art. 26, reprintedin 63 AM. J.INT'L L. 875, 884 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention]. This convention is codified international law and has been
cited as authority for customary law in court decisions and state practice. See Barcelona
Traction Case, [1970] I.C.J. 3, 303, 305; Nambia Case, [19711 I.C.J. 16, 47; Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, [1973] I.C.J. 3, 14, 18, 21, 43, 47; Nuclear Tests Case, 11974] 1.C.J. 253, 334-38, 349,
357, 418.
27. H. KELSEN & R. TUCKER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 456 (2d ed. 1966).
28. Comment, supra note 23.
29. Abramovsky (pt. 1),
supra note 5, at 398.
30. The delegate of France described the Hague Convention as containing "the obligation of apprehension of the alleged offender, a possibility of extradition, the obligation of
reference to the competent authority and the possibility of prosecution." ICAO Doc. 8877LC/161, at 17.15, reprintedin S. AGRAWALA, AIRCRAFT HIJACKING AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 132 (1973).
31. As of 1973, international sentences for skyjacking had ranged from two to seven
years. Evans, supra note 9, at 659.
32. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 2.
33. Id. (emphasis added).
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tory state to rigorously punish a convicted skyjacker, but state
practice indicates that skyjackers often escape actual liability. Apparently this is due to the Convention's failure to delineate the
scope of the "severe penalties" contemplated.3 4
The effect of the optional prosecution provision and the ambiguous penalty provision is a substantial loophole through which a
signatory state may allow a skyjacker to evade harsh punishment. 35
In practice, a state may comply with its treaty obligations by prosecuting an offender, but conviction may be followed by only a light
sentence 36 or a heavy sentence with early eligibility for parole.37 It
can be argued, therefore, that substantial and certain punishment of
skyjackers does not yet exist. To identify the incipient reasons for
this failure to punish skyjackers, the inconsistency between theory
and practice will be examined.
II.

"LOOPHOLES"

IN STATE PRACTICE:

POLITICAL EXCEPTIONS

The benign treatment of skyjackers is largely due to sympathies inherent in the "political offense" and "political refugee" exceptions to extradition, 3 exceptions firmly established in
international practice and the political ideologies of many nations.
A.

The PoliticalOffense Exception

Although there is not a recognized definition of "political offense" in international law, there are cases frequently cited that es34. There are two basic reasons for the ambiguity of the penalty provision (art. 2): the
drafters sought wide ratification and felt mandatory penalties would hinder that goal; many
states felt mandatory penalties would interfere with sovereign discretion. Abramovsky (pt.
1), supra note 5, at 399.
35. Id.
36. In 1978 a Czechoslovakian skyjacker seeking political asylum was sentenced to four
years imprisonment by a West German court. L.A. Times, Oct. 5, 1978, pt. I, at 23, col. I.
37. In 1972 a Canadian court convicted and sentenced a skyjacker to life imprisonment;
however, the local press reported he would be eligible for parole in 1979. Calgary (Alberta)
Herald, Apr. 12, 1972, at 1, col. 5; id., Apr. 13, 1972, at 4, col. I, citedin Evans, supra note 9,
at 658 n.79. It is clear, therefore, that rigorous sentencing standards alone will not provide
"severe penalties." United States courts have held that mandatory sentences are not required
by the standards set forth in 49 U.S.C. § 1472(i) (1976) (domestic skyjacking law which has
the same penalty provision as 49 U.S.C. § 1472(n)(1976)); see note 5 supra. "49 U.S.C.
§ 1472(i) does not provide for a mandatory penalty, therefore allowing the trial judge to
impose an indeterminate sentence . . . the statute does not expressly prohibit early parole."
United States v. Remling, 548 F.2d 1974, 1975 (6th Cir. 1977).
38. See Abramovsky (pt. 1), supra note 5, at 398-405.
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tablish the parameters of the concept. 39 The landmark British case,
In re Castioni,4 ° established the proposition that political offenses
were acts that "were incidental to and formed a part of a political
disturbance.

.

.

in which [the perpetrator] was taking part."'" The

requirement that the acts in question be part of a larger political
movement was subsequently liberalized and the political offense
concept expanded in ExparteKolczynski.12 In that case, the British
courts refused to extradite Polish seamen who were guilty of mutiny, on the grounds that they acted to "prevent themselves [from]
being prosecuted for a political offence and.

.

. ,

therefore, the of-

fence had a political character."4 3 In other words, the defendant
need not be taking part in a political movement per se. It is sufficient that he seek to escape state prosecution for political acts. This
interpretation of the political offense exception is presently employed by certain states upon the minimal grounds that the offender
44
would be subject to prosecution by his state for political reasons.
Two kinds of skyjackers have been considered to fall within
the political offense exception.4 5 The first, and most widely acknowledged kind, is the person who resorts to skyjacking in an attempt to escape an oppressive political system. 46 The second kind
of skyjacker is the international terrorist who seeks global recognition of his cause by methods of "political blackmail, destruction of
. . . aircraft, and the incarceration or death of its passengers." 4 7
Terrorist skyjackers have been consistently granted political
asylum, aid, or both by certain states. 48 In two recent cases (Holder39. Abramovsky (pt. 1), supra note 5, at 400. Note, Bringing the Terrorist to Justice, II
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 71 (1978).

40. [18911 1 Q.B. 149.
41. Id. at 159, 166.
42. [19551 I Q.B. 540.
43. Id. at 550.
44. France has refused extradition to the United States on these grounds in two recent
cases (Holder-Kerkow and Brown). 1975 DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L. 168; 1976 DIG. U.S.
PRAC. INT'L L. 124; see note 49 infra.

45. See Abramovsky (pt. 1), supra note 5, at 382-84.
46. Id.
47. Id. An accepted legal definition of "international terrorism" has not been formulated. I R. FRIEDLANDER, TERRORISM, DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL CONTROL 3 (1979). However, a useful definition is: "[Aicts of violence waged outside the
accepted rules and procedures of international diplomacy and war. Jenkins, International
Terrorism.-A New Mode of Conflict, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND WORLD SECURITY
20 (D. Carlton & C. Schaeff eds. 1975).
48. Algeria, Libya, Lebanon, and Syria have repeatedly granted asylum or given aid.
Abramovsky (pt. 3), supra note 4. In 1979, Libya was involved in an incident where three

Tunisian men seized an Air Tunis jetliner in an attempt to coerce the release of a labor
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Kerkow and Brown)49 involving extradition requests by the United
States, a French court of appeal refused to extradite United States
citizens on the grounds that their acts of skyjacking fell within the
political offense exception of the United States-France Extradition
Treaty. 0 In Holder-Kerkow,5 1 the French court held that the
skyjackers had a "political motive" that qualified their act as a political offense. 2 In Brown,5 3 the same court held that the skyjackers
were escaping racial and political oppression, and viewed the
United States charges against them as political persecution.5 4 Although skyjacking is included in the United States-France Extradition Treaty,5 5 it is subject to the provision setting forth the political
offense exception,5" and the application of the extradition process is
subject to the discretion of the requested state. 7 The decisions of
the French court58 indicate that the extradition provision of the
Hague Convention5 9 is not controlling. In Brown,6" however,
leader held by Tunisian authorities. The plane was eventually directed to Libya where local
authorities provided the skyjackers with fuel and food. L.A. Times, Jan. 13, 1979, pt. 1, at 2,
col. I.
49. Holder-Kerkow involved the seizure of'a domestic United States flight in 1972,
which eventually was directed to Algeria. The alleged skyjackers were indicted in the United
States for skyjacking (aircraft piracy), kidnapping, and extortion ($50,000) - all extraditable
offenses under Article II of the United States-France Extradition Treaty, infra note 50.
Holder, at one point in the incident, demanded that the flight go to Hanoi, Vietnam. France
refused extradition under Article IV of the treaty, stating that Holder's demands were evidence of a political motive and, therefore, brought the matter within the scope of the political
offense exception to extradition. 1975 DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L. 168. Brown also involved
the seizure of a domestic U.S. flight in 1972, which eventually landed in Algeria. The alleged
skyjackers, supposedly affiliated with the Black Panther Party, demanded and received one
million dollars ransom, most of which was returned by the Algerian government. They were
arrested in Paris in 1976, and extradition to the United States was refused on the basis of
Article IV of the United States-France Extradition Treaty, infra note 50. 1976 DIG. U.S.
PRAC. INT'L L. 124. For the final disposition of this case, see notes 104-07, 62-70 infra, and
accompanying text.
50. United States-France Extradition Treaty, Feb. 12, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 407, T.I.A.S. No.
7075.
51. See 1975 DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L. 168.
52. Id. at 169.
53. See 1976 DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L. 124.
54. Id. at 125.
55. United States-France Extradition Treaty, supra note 50, art. IV.
56. Id.
57. Article IV also provides: "If any question arises as to whether a case comes within
the provisions of this subparagraph, the authorities of the Government on which the requisition is made shall decide." Id.
58. See 1975 DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L. 168; 1976 DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L. 124.
59. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 8.
60. See 1976 DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L. 124.
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France did fulfill its obligations under the Hague Convention 6' by
prosecuting the offenders.6 2
B. The PoliticalRefugee Exception
Although the political offense exception is somewhat amorphous, the political refugee exception is well-defined as a bar to
extradition. 63 The Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 64 defines a refugee as a person who would be subject to political persecution if he returned to his state of nationality. 6 Article 33 of the
Protocol extends this definition by prohibiting the extradition of a
refugee to any state that would subject him to racial, religious, social, or political persecution.6 6
61. See Hague Convention, supra note 5.
62. See text accompanying notes 104-07 infra. There have not been any steps taken
towards extradition or prosecution in ilolder-Kerkow. See text accompanying note 129 infra. The French declaration issued at the signing of the European Convention, infra note 8 1,
is a straightforward explanation of the French position in regard to limitations on the suppression of terrorism. In part it states:
It is self-evident that efficiency in this struggle must be reconciled with respect for
the fundamental principles of our criminal law and of our Constitution, which
states in its Preamble that "Anyonepersecuted on account of his action for the cause
of liberty has the right to asylum on the territory of the republic."
15 FORWARD IN EUROPE, LEGAL SUPPLEMENT 9 (1977), reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MATS.

1329 (1977) (emphasis added).
63. See Abramovsky (pt. 1), supra note 5, at 402-03.
64. Refugee Convention, supra note 6.
65. The Refugee Convention in part provides:
[A person] having a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
Id. art. 1, para. A(2). This provision is, however, limited by a subsequent provision which
states:
The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to
whom there are serious reasons for considering that:
(a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against
humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision
in respect of such crimes;
(b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee;
(c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the
United Nations.
Id. art. 1, para. F.
66. Article 33, Prohibition of Expulsion or Return (Refoulement), provides:
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return (refouler) a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion.
Subsection 2 of Article 33 limits the scope of subsection 1:
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The practice of West Germany underscores the primacy of political refugees' rights. Since the ratification of the Hague Convention in 1970, West Germany has categorically refused to extradite
skyjackers seeking political asylum from East European countries.67 This practice is generally attributable to ideological differences between nations, and to the conflicts and sympathies that
develop from them.6 8
The Constitution of the Soviet Union6 9 "affords the right of
asylum to foreign citizens persecuted for defending the interests of
working people, or for scientific activities, or for struggling for national liberation."7 The Soviet provision is clearly polemical while
the West German Constitution 7 1 simply states that "persons persecuted for political reasons shall enjoy the right of asylum. '72 In
practice such formal distinctions are insignificant, because decisions regarding asylum and extradition are frequently based upon
the political allegiance of the refugee in question and the degree of
ideological antagonism between the host state and the state requesting extradition.7 3 As with the political offense exception, these decisions are often influenced by the political climate of the host
state.7 4 If a Soviet Jew, for example, were to skyjack a plane in the
Soviet Union and fly to the United States, it is unlikely the offender
would be extradited, irrespective of the hard-line United States policy on skyjacking.7 5
West German practice regarding East European skyjackers, by
comparison, is understandable even though it conflicts with the for2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee
whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the
country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.
d. art. 33.
67. Trimborn, supra note 7.
68. Green, Extradition v. Asylum ForAerialHyjackers, 10 Is. L. REV. 207, 208-09 (1975).
69. KOHCTITUCIYA (Constitution) (U.S.S.R.), reprinted in Hazard, The Constitution of
the Union of Sopiet Socialist Republics, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD,
HISTORIC CONSTITUTIONS (G. Flanz & A. Blaustein eds. 1972).

70. Id. art. 129.
71.

GRUNDOESETZ (W. Ger.), reprinted in Flanz, Basic Lawfor the Federal Republic of
THE WORLD (G. Flanz & A. Blaustein

Germany, V CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
eds. 1974).
72. Id. art. 16.
73. Green, supra note 68, at 209.
74. Abramovsky (pt. i), supra note 5, at 400.
75. 49 U.S.C. § 1472(n)(1)(A) & (B) (1976).
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mally expressed German opposition to acts of skyjacking. 76 It is
important to note that the West German government does not deny
extradition solely on the grounds that the alleged skyjacker comes
under the political refugee exception. Extradition is refused on jurisdictional grounds when portions of the alleged crimes took place
in West German territory.7 7 This is consistent with the jurisdictional provisions of the Hague Convention, which clearly say that a
state may establish jurisdiction over the offense and the perpetrator
when the skyjacked aircraft lands in its territory with the alleged
offender on board.7 8 The West German practice of prosecuting and
sentencing East European skyjackers also complies with the letter
of the Convention.7 9
Use of the political exceptions has caused considerable consternation in the world community, as evidenced by the Bonn Declaration. 0 Though the exceptions conflict significantly with
international measures to deter skyjacking,81 they are deeply rooted
in international practice; 82 the political offense exception, for example, is often included in extradition treaties. 83 In effect, a suspect
may be subject to extradition by the terms of a treaty yet exempt
76. West Germany has inter alia ratified the Hague Convention and is a party to the
Bonn Declaration. Hague Convention, supra note 5; Bonn Declaration, supra note 1.
77. Trimborn, supra note 7.
78. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 4, para. (1)(B).
79. Id. art. 7; see text accompanying note 24 supra.
80. Bonn Declaration, supra note 1. The preamble sets forth the intent of the party
nations to "intensify their joint efforts to combat international terrorism."
81. Article 7 of the Hague Convention states that offenders are to be extradited or subject to prosecution "without exception whatsoever," and Article 2 states that offenders ought
to be subject to "severe penalties." Hague Convention, supra note 5. This conflict has international legal recognition; the recent European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism
expressly eliminates employment of the political offense exception as a bar to extradition
requests for alleged skyjackers. Article I provides, in part:
For the purposes of extradition between Contracting states, none of the following
offenses shall be regarded as a political offense or as an offense connected with a
political offense or as an offense inspired by political motives:
a. an offense within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft, signed at the Hague on 16 December 1971 . . . [that is, skyjacking].
European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, done Jan. 27, 1977, enteredintoforce
Aug. 4, 1978, reprintedin 15 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 1272 (1976) [hereinafter cited as European

Convention]. The following countries have ratified the Convention: Austria, Denmark,
West Germany, Sweden, and England. 17 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 1043 (1978). It should be
noted that France is a signatory of, but did not ratify, the European Convention. Therefore,
France is not bound by its terms.

14 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 45

(1968).
82. For a terse discussion of the international development of the political offense doctrine, see FRIEDLANDER, supra note 47, at 72-82.
83. Article II of the agreement between the United States and France provides, in part:
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from extradition if a political character can be attributed to the alleged criminal act.84
One writer suggests, however, that Article 8(1) of the Hague
85
Convention, contradicts the effect of political offense provisions,
because it states that skyjacking shall "be included as an extraditable offense in any extradition treaty between contracting states." 86
Applying the customary rule of international law that treaties
which are later in time prevail, 87 a state bound by both a prior extradition treaty containing a political offense exception and by the
Hague Convention8 8 could not lawfully invoke the exception to refuse extradition to another signatory state. 89 A different result is
possible, however, by applying the customary rule ofjus aequum.9 °
Underjus aequum, conflicting treaties are applied in a "reasonable
and equitable manner"; 91 one treaty is not necessarily superior to
the other because it came into force at a later date.9 2 State practice
indicates that the rule ofjus aequum is being applied to treaty conflicts concerning extradition of skyjackers.
The international law principle ofJus cogens may also apply in
the case of skyjacking. 93 Because jus cogens implies norms from
which no derogation is permissible, the political exceptions might
not justify failure to prosecute and penalize skyjackers. Underjus
cogens, if the crime is committed, the perpetrator(s) must be punExtradition shall be granted for the following acts if they are punished as
crimes or offenses by the laws of both States:
19. Revolt on board an aircraft against the authority of the captain; any
seizure or exercise of control, by force or threat of force or violence, of an aircraft.
Article IV provides, in part:
Extradition shall not be granted in any of the following circumstances:
4. If the offense for which the individual's extradition is requested is of a
political character, or if he proves that the requisition for his surrender has, in fact,
been made with a view to try or punish him for an offense of a political character.
United States-France Extradition Treaty, supra note 50, arts. 2, 4.
84. Id.
85. Abramovsky (pt. I), supra note 5, at 403.
86. Hague Convention, supra note 5.
87. The Vienna Convention states: When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties
also to the later treaty . . . the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are
compatible with those of the later treaty. Vienna Convention, supra note 26, art. 30, § 3.
88. Hague Convention, supra note 5.
89. Abramovsky (pt. 1),supra note 5, at 403.
90. Rules of international law must be interpreted and applied in a reasonable and
equitable manner. SCHWARZENBERGER & BROWN, supra note 25, at 23, 24, 131.

91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See text accompanying notes 162-69 infra.
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ished; the political quality of the crime can at best be considered as
a mitigating circumstance in determining punishment.9 4
Nevertheless, political exceptions are recognized in state practice. As discussed above, all that is required where extradition is
refused is the mere submission of the alleged offender to the appropriate prosecuting authorities.9 5 West German practice described
above may go beyond the letter of the Hague Convention, but the
question remains whether this sort of treatment complies with the
spirit and purpose of the Convention to eradicate skyjacking
through deterrence. 96
III.

TOKEN SENTENCES AS "SEVERE PENALTIES": UNDERMINING
THE GOAL OF DETERRENCE

It is important to keep in mind the underlying purpose of the
Hague Convention - to make the benefits of skyjacking unattractive in view of punishment for the offense.97 State sentencing practices, however, do not carry out this fundamental purpose; this is
especially evident regarding the treatment of political refugees.9 8
supra note 30, at 133. Contra, E. MCWHINNEY, THE ILLEGAL DIVER104-05 (1975), where it is concluded on the basis of
empirical evidence . . . [that] the "freedom of the air" is certainly not regarded
today as an absolute orparamountprinciple, but a relative one, the degree of whose
compromise with other competing interests will be determined only in concrete
cases, depending in part on the particular State-participants in those cases.
ld. at 105 (emphasis added). The "empirical evidence" relied upon by McWhinney is, however, largely comprised of the fact that as of 1975, none of the "leading 'airline' states" had
actually taken material steps towards applying obvious, effective deterrent sanctions to states
that are havens for skyjackers. Clearly, the Bonn Declaration is a statement of intent by
"leading 'airline' states" to do just that; therefore, if these intentions are carried into action,
the "freedom of the air" would be at least a developingjus cogens. Id. at 105.
95. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
96. See the preamble of the Hague Convention, which in part provides: "Considering
that, for the purpose of deterring such acts, there is an urgent need to provide appropriate
measures for punishment of offenders .. " Hague Convention, supra note 5. It should be
noted that prosecution of skyjackers seeking political asylum does not violate the Refugee
Convention, supra note 6. Evans, supra note 9, at 660.
97. See id.
98. For the case of Ladislar Molnar where a four-year sentence was meted out, see L.A.
Times, Oct. 5, 1978, pt. I, at 23, col. 3. Special treatment for political refugees has been
underscored in the more recent case of Tiede, an East German seeking asylum. He skyjacked a Polish airliner on Aug. 30, 1978, to Templehof, a United States airbase, in West Berlin.
Since United States jurisdiction prevailed, Tiede was tried by a United States district court
judge under West German law before a West German jury. Although Tiede had used bodily
force, threats of death, and caused the airliner to land at a runway of insufficient length, he
was convicted only of hostage-taking. He was acquitted of all other charges, including air
piracy, and subsequently released by the presiding judge who noted that nine months pretrial
confinement constituted sufficient punishment. L.A. Times, May 29, 1979, pt. I, at 5, col. 6.
94.

AGRAWALA,

SION OF AIRCRAFT
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Generally, people who employ skyjacking to leave an oppressive
situation are escaping from what would effectively be a life sentence. Faced with a lifetime of intolerable conditions, skyjackers
apparently consider a few years in a sympathetic nation's jail and a
promise of asylum and citizenship upon release a worthwhile investment. 99
West Germany, for example, has sentenced East European
skyjackers to prison terms averaging from two to four years."° As
recently as October 4, 1978, a Czechoslovakian skyjacker, who
sought political asylum, was sentenced to a four-year term.'' According to West German practice, the skyjacker's request for asylum will be decided after he serves his sentence; however, West
Germany has never extradited an East European refugee. 0 2 This
treatment cannot be said to have a genuine deterrent effect upon
potential skyjackers seeking political asylum. Considering the
steady influx of skyjackers seeking political asylum in West Germany and the minimal sentences imposed on offenders, West German practice is so contrary to the goal of deterrence 0 3 that it
undermines that goal.
A more striking example of state sentencing practice frustrating the goal of deterrence is found in the Brown case.1'4 A jury
found the defendants guilty of skyjacking, hostage-taking, and extortion, but noted "extenuating circumstances" in accord with the
defense argument that the crimes were committed as a "political
act" in response to "American racism."' 1 5 Consequently, two of
the defendants were sentenced to five years imprisonment; the other
two were given five-year sentences, with two-year suspensions. 10 6
Because the defendants spent two and one-half years in a French
jail awaiting trial, their actual periods of imprisonment are expected to range from a few days to six months. 07
Compared with West German practice, France's treatment of
Trimborn, W. Berlin Jury, Under a U.S Judge, Convicts East German, L.A. Times, May 27,
1979, pt. 1,at 5, col. I.
99. See Abramovsky (pt. 1),
supra note 5, at 383.
100. Trimborn, supra note 7.
101. Ladislar Molnar was convicted of skyjacking a Czechoslovakian airliner to Frankfurt in February, 1978. L.A. Times, Oct. 5, 1978, pt. 1,at 23, col. 3.
102. Trimborn, supra note 7.
103. See Hague Convention, supra note 5.
104. See 1976 DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L. 124.
105. 4 Americans Sentenced in Jet Hi/acking, L.A. Times, Nov. 25, 1978, pt. 1, at 5, col. 1.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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the defendants in Brown is perhaps even more contrary to the goal
of deterrence. The French court rather blatantly imposed light
sentences upon persons convicted of skyjacking and concomitant
crimes, who were certainly not fleeing from a nation that restricts
emigration. Although the defendants in Brown may have been subjected to "racist treatment"'' 0 8 in the United States, they were not
categorically denied the right to leave the country.'0 9 The distinction between French and West German treatment of skyjackers is
readily apparent. In France, offenders may expect lenient consequences to flow from a political offense exception analysis, while in
West Germany, treatment will be based upon the political refugee
exception. It can be argued that France's treatment of skyjackers is
more damaging to the goal of deterrence, because application of the
political offense exception is less acceptable internationally than is
the political refugee exception, I0 but the crucial point is that lenient treatment per se is contrary to the goal of deterrence. " I
Due to the inconsistency between state sentencing practice and
the goal of deterrence as expressed in the Hague Convention, the
question arises whether the lack of internationally consistent sentencing practice presents an unsolvable problem. The treatment a
skyjacker receives will most likely depend to a great degree upon
the national politics and attendant laws of the prosecuting state,
because a specific international definition of what constitutes a "severe penalty," as contemplated by the Hague Convention, does not
exist. 12 An example would be the right of asylum; the granting of
asylum depends upon the political ideology or laws of each particular nation." 3 In light of the agreement among the signatory states
that penalties should deter skyjacking, national treatment should
reflect that policy. 4 This is frequently not the case because of an
108.
109.

See 1976 DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L. 124.
It should be noted that three of the skyjackers in Brown were fugitives, two being

escapees from prison on sentences for murder and armed robbery, respectively, and the third
a United States Army deserter, Id. at 125.
110. Abramovsky (pt. 1), supra note 5, at 403, asserts that Article 8, paragraph 1, of the
Hague Convention forecloses designation of skyjacking as a political offense, but does not

legally prevent designating offenders as political refugees. Id. See European Convention,
supra note 81.

II.

See Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 2, and text accompanying note 33 supra.

112. The Hague Convention is silent both as to classification of the offense of skyjacking

(for example, as equivalent to attempted homicide) and in regards to a minimum sentence.
Abramovsky (pt. 1), supra note 5, at 399.
113. Green, supra note 68.
114. It is important to keep in mind the nature of deterrence. As a fundamental element
of sentencing, it refers to criminal sanctions imposed to discourage the general public from
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aspect inherent in the nature of criminal punishment."l 5
The primary consideration of most penal systems, in regard to
penalties, is that the punishment should fit the crime - the penalty
should be proportional to the culpability of the crime." 16 In practice, however, the degree of culpability will be predicated upon the
social, political, and economic interests of the state;"1 7 that is, the
penalty imposed upon a convicted skyjacker will be relative to the
sustained harm to the prosecuting state's interests."t 8 The question
of whether a penalty imposed upon a skyjacker is severe will therefore depend upon the national interests of the inquiring party.
While the Hague Convention signatories agree that skyjacking
should be deterred by severe penalties,' '9 the frequent result is the
imposition of penalties that are severe according to the standards of
the prosecuting state, but which fail to deter subsequent acts of
skyjacking. 2 0
The argument can be made that any substantial deprivation of
liberty is a severe penalty, but if the sum of the prosecuting state's
punishment does not have a genuine deterrent effect, then it fails to
fulfill the purpose of the Hague Convention.' The Bonn Declaration on Hijacking is an attempt to discourage states from harboring
skyjackers, thereby deterring commission of the offense.
committing a crime, to discourage repeat offenses by individuals, or both. In short, the aim is
crime prevention. See A. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING, § 5, at 24 (1978).
115. In broad terms, the principle of sovereignty accounts for variance in state practice.
See generally SCHWARZENBERGER & BROWN, supra note 25, at 51-54.

116. See generally CAMPBELL, supra note 114, at 6-12. In practice, sentences are often
determined by other considerations.

H. GROSS, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 437

(1979).
117. This follows from the function of sanctions, which "is the way in which the law
protects life, freedom, economics and other interests against delicts." I M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 63 (1952).

For example, certain Caribbean and Middle East-

ern states are effectively unable to punish skyjackers from other states, due to political or
security reasons or both; consider the September 1970 incident in Jordan where several
planes were blown up by Arab guerrillas, and the Jordanian government did nothing about
it. In addition, states are not likely to punish refugees oppressed by an opposing state, who
enter by way of skyjacked aircraft. AGRAWALA, supra note 30, at 128 n.275.
118. AGRAWALA, supra note 30, at 134.
119. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 2.
120. In light of the West German policy of refusing extradition of East Europeans,
Trimborn, supra note 6, and the fact that East Germans have an automatic right to West
German citizenship, Wash. Post, Aug. 31, 1978, § A, at 21, col. I, it is likely that even two
years imprisonment is considered severe by West German standards.
121. See Hague Convention, supra note 5, preamble.
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IV.

THE BONN DECLARATION ON HIJACKING

There is an urgent need to formulate viable, effective sanctions
which can be imposed upon states that systematically give refuge to
skyjackers' 2 2 - a need compounded by the threat of expanding
1 23
tactical use of skyjacking by coordinated global terrorist groups
and the absence of widely ratified international measures to deal
effectively with recalcitrant states. 124 The Bonn Declaration seeks
to provide a remedy for this problem:
The Heads of State and Government, concerned about terrorism
and the taking of hostages, declare that their Governments will
intensify their joint efforts to combat international terrorism.
To this end, in cases where a country refuses extradition or prosecution of those who have hijacked an aircraft and/or do not
return such aircraft, the Heads of State and Government are
jointly resolved that their Governments should take immediate
action to cease all flights to that country.
At the same time, their Governments will initiate action to halt
all incoming flights from that country or from any country by the
airlines of the country concerned. The Heads of State and Government urge other Governments to join them in this commit25
ment.1
122. From 1969 to 1978, there have been 393 skyjackings attempted, 201 of which have
been successful, according to the International Air Transport Association (IATA). FRIEDLANDER, supra note 47, at 140.
123. "[Fjrom 1968 on, hijacking evolved into the weapon, or the platform, of persons
. . .acting for . . . 'public' or political reasons . . .primarily . . . terrorist or guerrilla
groups. This type of skyjacking has been largely successful in terms of the offenders' goals."
See Sterling, supra note 9, at 71. Between 1968 and 1973, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) have, via skyjacking, obtained the release of 78 of their comrades.
Evans, supra note 9, at 644-48.
124. The Montreal, Hague, and Tokyo Conventions, supra note 5, do not contain provisions concerning recalcitrant states.
125. The parties to the Declaration are Britain, Canada, France, West Germany, Italy,
Japan, and the United States. The codification of the Declaration in the United States Code
reads, in part:
Whenever the President determines that a foreign nation is acting in a manner inconsistent with the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,
or if he determines that a foreign national permits the use of territory under its
jurisdiction as a base of operations or training or as a sanctuary for, or in anyway
arms, aides, or abets, any terrorist organization which knowingly uses the illegal
seizure of aircraft or the threat thereof as an instrument of policy, he may, without
notice or hearing and for as long as he determines necessary to assure the security
of aircraft against unlawful seizure, suspend (I) the right of any carrier or foreign
air carrier to engage in foreign air transportation, and the right of any person to
operate aircraft in foreign air commerce, to and from that foreign nation, and (2)
the right of any foreign air carrier to engage in foreign air transportation, and the
right of any foreign person to operate aircraft in foreign air commerce, between the
United States and any foreign nation which maintains air service between itself and
that foreign nation.
49 U.S.C. 1472 § 1114(a) (1974).
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Although the Declaration succinctly sets forth rigorous sanctions to be imposed upon a recalcitrant state, the actual meaning of
these words, as seen against the background of global reality, may
be something less than rigorous. To understand this, it is necessary
to first positively determine the purpose of the Declaration.
A.

Suggested Purpose of the Declaration

126
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
establishes a general rule that a treaty's language is to be assigned
ordinary meaning within the treaty's context, which is to be determined from the treaty's preamble. The preamble (first paragraph)
of the Bonn Declaration establishes the Declaration as an effort to
facilitate existing defenses against international terrorism. Assuming the focus of the Declaration is on terrorism, does the Declaration contemplate only terrorist skyjackers?
There are two key phrases in the second paragraph of the Declaration that indicate the kind 127 of skyjacker contemplated: "[tlo
this end," and "those who have skyjacked."' 2 8 If this language is
considered in light of the preamble's focus on terrorism, the "end"
referred to is clearly the intensification of "joint efforts to combat
international terrorism." Because the word "those" closely follows
the phrase "to this end" in the same sentence, it most likely refers to
terrorists. A literal analysis of the Declaration, therefore, strongly
suggests that only terrorist skyjackers were contemplated; this conclusion is reasonable in view of the consequences of a broader interpretation.
An interpretation applying the Declaration to all skyjackers
would obligate parties to the Declaration to apply the provided
sanctions to nations that refuse to extradite or prosecute political
refugees or political offenders. Such an interpretation would apply
to France, which has neither extradited nor prosecuted the suspects
in Holder-Kerkow.129 A reprimand by the United States Department of State has been the only action taken against France. 13 1
Considering the commitment of the Declaration's parties to politi-

126.
127.
various
128.
129.
130.

Vienna Convention, supra note 26.
See generally Abramovsky (pt. I), supra note 5, at 382-84, for a discussion of the
kinds of skyjackers.
Bonn Declaration, supra note i.
See 1975 DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L. 168.
Id.
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cal refugees, ' 3' the prevailing recognition of the political offense exception,1 32 and the severe economic consequences that would flow
from an aircraft boycott, 133 this limited response is a wise one. The
limited interpretation of the Declaration - that it only applies to
terrorist skyjackers - is, therefore, the most reasonable. This concern with terrorism among parties to the Declaration is more than a
matter of public policy; it is derived from fundamental interests

shared by those nations. 134
B.

The Effect on NationalInterests

Consider first the national interests promoted and impaired by
the Bonn Declaration. The parties to the Declaration are the seven
major capitalist nations.1 35 Marxist revolution, advocated by many
of the terrorist organizations, 36 is by definition in opposition to
capitalist control of economic systems; simultaneously, nationalist
Middle Eastern terrorists are determined to diminish Western influence in their countries. It is these seven nations, parties to the Bonn
Declaration, which stand to suffer the most from an increase in international terrorism. 37 Because terrorist groups frequently employ skyjacking to further their ends, 138 it is not surprising that
these states have consistently advocated stringent approaches to de13
terring the offense. 1
131. The parties to the Bonn Declaration have also ratified the Refugee Convention,
supra note 6.
132. See text accompanying notes 39-62 supra.
133. States on both sides of an aircraft boycott will suffer, especially if the offending state
normally grants transit facilities to major international carriers or imports heavily or both.
AGRAWALA, supra note 30, at 135.
134. See text accompanying note 125 supra.
135. They are: Britain, Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United
States. The seven nations collectively account for almost 70% of all capitalist nations' air
traffic. N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1978, § 1, at 44, col. 4. See IndustrializedNations Conclude AntiHi/acking Agreement, supra note 1.
136. The Red Brigades' chief, Renato Curcio, is quoted as saying the various terrorist
groups are forming into a single "organization of communist combat... [for the purpose of
striking at the] vital centers of multinational imperialism." Sterling, supra note 9, at 38.
137. Id.
138. See Evans, supra note 9.
139. In 1973, the Legal Committee of the ICAO decided by vote to reject a proposal that
if a suspension of air services convention could be established, collective action should be
taken against recalcitrant nonparty states. The proponents of the proposal included Canada,
West Germany, Britain, and the United States. France and Japan voted against the measure,
and Italy abstained. See ICAO Doc. 9050-LC/169-1, at 88-89 (1973); Abramovsky (pt. 3),
supra note 4, at 470. Note that the proposal for 2 convention discussed by the Legal Committee was never considered in plenary discussion in an International Air Conference on Air
Law and an Extraordinary Assembly of the ICAO held at Rome from August 28 to Septem-
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The United States has advocated that mandatory extradition
of skyjackers be international practice, regardless of the individual
circumstances.' 40 In light of public safety and financial interests
affected by skyjacking, political exceptions should not be considered. Not surprisingly, states strongly opposed to tougher sanctions
are those which harbor skyjackers, sympathize with their ideological motivations, or both. 4 ' Due to this divergence of interests, apparently rigorous international measures"' prior to the Declaration
were equivocally enforced. 4 3 Significantly, the Bonn Declaration
is a reactionary measure intended to force recalcitrant states to deal
harshly with skyjackers.144
C. A New Approach to Deterrence: Sanctions Imposedfor State
Actions that Encourage Commission of the Offense
In addition to measures designed to deter skyjackers, the Bonn
Declaration focuses on sanctions designed to deter nations from encouraging the commission of the offense. In effect, the spirit of the
Declaration is a recognition of the fact that states are frequently de
ber 21, 1973. Murphy, InternationalLegal Controls of InternationalTerrorism.- Performance
and Prospects, 63 ILL. B.J. 444, 447 (1975).
140. A Department of State memorandum of law submitted to the French Foreign Ministry and to the Justice Ministry in support of the request for extradition of Willie Roger
Holder and Mary Katherine Kerkow summarizes the United States' position. That memorandum in part states:
While there are cases in years past in which states held a particular hijacking to be
a politicaloffense where the persons involved were fleeing from tyranny and faced
severe political persecution if they returned, the danger inherent in the increasing
incidence of aircraft hijacking in more recent years has . . . given grounds for a
presumption that aircrafthiacking is a most serious common crime regardlessof the
circumstances.
1975 DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L. 172 (emphasis added).
141. Algeria and Lebanon have repeatedly given aid or granted asylum to skyjackers,
Abramovsky (pt. 3), supra note 4, at 461, and were among the nations, as ICAO members,
that voted against the inclusion of any provisions in proposed conventions that would call for
joint action against nonparty states. It should be noted that France also voted against such
provisions, yet was a party to the Bonn Declaration, which contemplates joint action against
recalcitrant nonparty states. See ICAO Doc. 9050-LC/169-1, at 88-89.
142. In particular, the "severe penalties" urged in the Hague Convention. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
143. Abramovsky (pt. 1), supra note 5, at 398-99.
144. Abramovsky predicted the promulgation of a measure like the Bonn Declaration:
Failureto adopt a significant Convention could lead states with a substantial interest
in international air transport to resort to unoff ial collective or unilateral action
which might seriously affect the economic well-being and sovereignty of states
deemed by them to have acted contrary to the best interests of international civil
aviation.
Abramovsky (pt. 3), supra note 4, at 463 (emphasis added). Compare note 158 supra.
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facto accomplices to acts of skyjacking. 4 5 Giving safe refuge to a
skyjacker amounts to aiding and abetting the offender, 46 and the
existence of havens of refuge encourages the perpetration of
skyjacking. 147 The rationale of the Declaration would appear to be
that foreclosing the possibility of a48skyjacker finding refuge reduces
the attractiveness of the offense.'
In addition to eliminating refuge for skyjackers, the Declaration mandates that states actually prosecute offenders rather than
merely submit their cases to prosecution. 49 It does not appear,
however, that this will have a substantial deterrent impact. The
prosecution and light sentencing practices of West Germany have
failed to discourage refugees from skyjacking aircraft and landing
in that state. 50 It is foreseeable that if states which have traditionally harbored terrorist skyjackers begin prosecuting them, they will
imitate the lenient West German and French practice. As a Bonn
Justice Ministry official stated in reference to the Declaration, "An
offending nation could conform to the letter, if not the spirit of the
If a
demand by merely imposing token sanctions on skyjackers."'
state violates the terms of the Declaration, the question arises
whether a legal basis exists for application of the consequent sanctions - does the Bonn Declaration have internationally valid legal
force?
D

Legal Enforceability of the Bonn Declaration

Between parties, the legal force of the Declaration is uncertain.
According to customary international law, an unsigned declaration
145. Abramovsky (pt. 3), supra note 4, at 462, 483. National complicity must be considered in light of the fact that a state can, with impunity, refuse to implement its obligations
under the Tokyo, Hague, or Montreal Convention, but no penalty can be attached to such
breach. AGRAWALA, supra note 30, at 120.
146. See text accompanying note 94 supra.
147. Id.
148. This is clear considering the absurdity of skyjacking a plane with nowhere to go.
Although aircraft has been skyjacked merely for the purpose of seizure and the immediate
attention to the individual which follows, such cases are rare; this type of offender has been
described as: "[T~he mentally deranged individual who has chosen hijacking either as a
device to gain recognition and notoriety or as a mode of escape from intolerable psychological pressures." Abramovsky (pt. 1), supra note 5, at 383. Moreover, since 1968, skyjacking
has evolved from a crime committed primarily for personal reasons into a tactic employed
primarily by terrorists. Evans, supra note 9, at 648.
149. The Hague Convention, merely required the submission of alleged offenders to
prosecutorial authorities. Hague Convention, supra note 5. See note 29 supra, and accompanying text.
150. See note 98 supra; see also text accompanying note 101 supra.
151. Trimborn, supra note 7.
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has moral but not legal effect; it is at best a promise to enact the
contents in a legally enforceable form.' 5 2 Conversely, the Vienna
Convention implies that such agreements do have legal force, but
fails to elaborate on the point.' 5 3 The question becomes academic
when one considers the substantial interests shared by the parties to
the Declaration, for they are among the nations most susceptible to
terrorist skyjacking' 54 and have repeatedly suffered from such incidents. 155 The more important question lies in the last sentence of
the Declaration, which implies that in order for anti-skyjacking
laws to be effective, all states must comply with the provisions of
156
the Declaration.
The legal force of the Declaration upon non-party states is of
critical importance; it is against these nations that the Declaration's
sanctions were most likely intended to apply.'5 7 The Declaration
calls for the imposition of its sanctions upon any state that violates
its provisions, whether or not the state in question is a party to the
Declaration or any other civil aviation convention. 158 Certain principles of international law suggest that such application would be
valid; some suggest otherwise.
As a matter of customary international law, a state may not be
bound to the terms of an agreement to which it is not a party. The
Vienna Convention states that "[a] treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third state without its consent."' 5 9 Furthermore, it seems that imposing sanctions upon non-party states is
repugnant to the customary international law concept of state sovereignty.' 6 While this argument is viable, it is susceptible to the
152.

5 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 34, 35 (1943).

153. "The fact that the Convention does not apply to international agreements ... not
in written form, shall not effect. . . the legal force of such agreements." Vienna Convention,
supra note 26, art. 3(a).
154. See note 137 supra, and accompanying text.
155. See generally Evans, supra note 9, for a statistical analysis.
156. This has been stated by one writer as an obvious necessity: "Only the imposition of
international obligations on all states, and consequent national legislation to give effect to
such obligations, could prove really fruitful . . . since the states most willing to punish hijackers are not the ones wherein the hijackers generally land or escape to." AGRAWALA,
supra note 30, at 21, 132 (emphasis added). It has also been noted that in order for the
Tokyo, Hague, and Montreal Conventions to be effective, "adherence by all states is necessary." Abramovsky (pt. 3), supra note 4, at 482.
157. Abramovsky (p t . 3), supra note 4, at 452.
158. The Declaration implicitly refers to any nation where it states, "[l]n cases where a
" Bonn Declaration, supra note 1, and text
country refuses extradition or prosecution ....
accompanying note 125 supra (emphasis added).
159. Vienna Convention, supra note 26, art. 34.
160. This is one of the main arguments of "nations seeking to restrict the applicability of
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rebuttal that a treaty may become binding upon a third state as a
customary rule of international law. The Vienna Convention expressly states this principle as well.' 6 ' A more forceful rebuttal can
be made, however, on the basis of two other principles of international law -jus cogens16 and the "protective principle."' 6 3
Whiteman states: "Jus cogens takes precedence in the realm of
international law over customary and conventional international
law."' 6 4 Jus cogens is defined by the Vienna Convention as a
"[pleremptory norm of general international law," which is "accepted and recognized by the international community of states
. . . as a normfrom which no derogation ispermittedand which can
be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international
law having the same character."' 165 This concept refers to certain
166
obligations and rights to which no contradiction is acceptable.
The obligations incumbent upon nations flowing from jus
cogens are owed to all nations; correlatively, each nation has the
right to expect all other nations to honor those obligations. The
International Court of Justice, in recognizing this axiom, has stated
that "such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law from the outlawing of acts of aggression ....
Skyjacking is an aggressive act which is so reprehensible as to be
not only illegal but universally wrong (malum in se). Hence, it is a
proposed joint-action instruments to member states." Abramovsky (pt. 3), supra note 4, at
467.
161. "Rules in a treaty become binding on third States through international custom. Nothing in articles 34 to 37 precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a
third State as a customary rule of international law, recognized as such." Vienna Convention, supra note 26, art. 38. In a mock skyjacking trial, Chesterfield Smith argued that a rule
set forth in a treaty may become binding upon a third state as a customary rule of international law in light of the Vienna Convention. WORLD PEACE THROUGH LAW CENTER,
ABIDJAN DEMONSTRATION TRIAL ON AIRCRAFT HIJACKING 40-41 (1975).

162. Jus cogens literally means compelling law. Whiteman, supra note 3, at 609 n.I.
163. The "protective principle" is a legal concept which justifies a nation taking protective, extraterritorial action:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to
conduct outside its territory that threatens its security as a state or the operation of
its governmental functions, provided the conduct is generally recognized as a crime
under the law of states that have reasonable developed legal systems.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 33, para. 1
(1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
164. Whiteman, supra note 3, at 609 (emphasis added).

165. Vienna Convention, supra note 26, art. 53 (emphasis added).
166.
456.

"Norm" refers to both obligations and rights. KELSEN & TUCKER, supra note 27, at

167. Whiteman, supra note 3, at 610.
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violation ofjus cogens. 168
Because skyjacking is an aggressive act violating jus cogens,
providing sanctuary for skyjackers can also be considered to be a
commission of the crime. 169 States providing sanctuary violate jus
cogens irrespective of whether or not they are party to an international agreement such as the Bonn Declaration. Therefore, nonparty states, as a consequence of their violatingjuscogens, are subject to sanctions notwithstanding the Declaration. Jus cogens is not
created by agreement (ex contracto); it is a set of fundamental
"guiding principles reflecting the basic values of the international
society in its actual stage of development."'' 70 Jus cogens provides a
legal basis for considering non-party, harboring states to be in violation of international law. The protective principle, by analogy,
provides a legal basis for imposing sanctions.
The protective principle allows a state to obtain jurisdiction
over an individual who commits an offense outside its territory. 17 1
Acts (or omissions) that have a "potentially dangerous effect" upon
security or governmental functions justify a state in taking protective measures.' 72 This principle justifies the imposition of the sanctions prescribed by the Bonn Declaration against nations providing
sanctuary for skyjackers. As one commentator forcefully states,
By serving as sanctuaries to offenders, states encourage the perpetration of unlawful acts, which, occurring outside their territorial boundaries, affect the social, economic, and political interests
of other states. No rule exists in international law which condones such activity, nor does international law mandate inaction
by states whose nationals and economic interests are victimized.
While acts of force may be prohibited, no restriction is placed
upon states which take affirmative action in the form of denial of
goods or services in order to obtain compliance with interna168. Whiteman lists matters "outlawed or needed to be outlawed by world consensus
under international law (ji/s cogens)." Included therein are both "[h]ijacking of air traffic"
and "[plolitical terrorism abroad, including terroristic activities." Id. at 625. The fact that
skyjacking violates a developing norm has been noted: "The safety and development of
international civil aviation which greatly helps to create and preserve friendship and understanding among nations and peoples of the world, is in the nature of a developing basic norm
(jus cogens)." AGRAWALA, supra note 30, at 133 (emphasis added).
169. See Abramovsky (pt. 3), supra note 4, at 483.
170. Whiteman, supra note 3, at 615 (statement of Prof. Suy).
171. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 163, and accompanying text.
172. Id. Comment C, in part, states: "Under the rule stated in Subsection (1) of this
Section, a state may prescribe a rule of criminal law applicable to conduct outside its territory . . . that has a potentially adverse effect upon its security or governmental functions."
1d. (emphasis added).
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tional law and to ensure the safety of international civil aviation
and world peace. States which systematically harbor perpetrators or otherwise aid and abet the perpetration of inimical acts
should not be permitted to hide behind the shield of sovereignty
in order to prevent reaction to acts which are designed to affect
adversely beyond their own boundary. Thus [retaliatory sanctions] need not be predicated upon offending states' violations of
treaties which they did not ratify, but rather acts or omissions
which aid and abet the perpetration
of unlawful acts outside
73
their national boundaries. 1
This concept means that a state should not be barred, under the
principle of sovereignty, from taking nonviolent action against a
state whose acts or omissions materially and detrimentally affect
it. 174 To hold otherwise is to deny the universal right of self-defense; when an injury is inflicted, it is the right of the injured to take
steps to prevent a reoccurrence of the injurious offense.' 75 Although, as argued above, there is a legal basis for application of the
Declaration's sanctions, it is important to consider foreseeable
problems of enforcement.
V.

AIRCRAFT BOYCOTT: PROBLEMS OF ENFORCEMENT

There are three basic aspects to examine concerning enforcement of the Bonn Declaration's sanctions - the acceptance of such
action by the international community, the willingness of states to
engage in enforcement measures, and finally, in light of national
practice regarding the treatment of skyjackers, the effectiveness of
enforcement in achieving the goal of eradicating skyjacking.
A.

HistoricalLegal Basisfor Enforcement

While in theory it can be said that the Bonn Declaration applies to both party and non-party states, the question of how to
effectively and legally enforce the Declaration remains. Is there an
historical legal basis for assuming that the imposition of sanctions
upon a recalcitrant state would produce the desired results and be
tolerated by the international community? The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 provides a good example of this problem and suggests
173. Abramovsky (pt. 3), supra note 4, at 483-84.
174. See SCHWARZENBERGER & BROWN, supra note 25, at 150, where it is noted that
retaliatory sanctions "are in themselves illegal. They receive however, their justification
from being acts of retaliation against a preceding illegal act by a party against which reprisals
are applied." fd. (emphasis added).
175. Id.
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an answer to this question. 17 6
In response to the shipping and installation of medium-range
nuclear missiles in Cuba by the Soviet Union, the United States
imposed a "quarantine" on Cuba. This action consisted of a blockade by United States Naval Forces of all ships bound for Cuba.
The quarantine was intended to prevent further missile shipments
and to induce the Cuban government to remove the missiles. 177 Although Cuba and the Soviet Union strongly protested this action,
shipments were discontinued and existing missiles were removed. 178 Two multilateral treaties provided legal foundation for
the United States blockade: The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) 79 and the Charter of the United Nations. 180
Under the Rio Treaty, if the "[p]eace of [the] America[s]" is
endangered, then inter alia the "interruption" of sea communications and use of armed forces may be imposed. 18 In appropriate
circumstances, these actions are in conformity with Chapter VIII of
176. The analogy to the subject of this Comment is that insofar as nations within a region
share certain territorial interests and can justify self-help on the basis of the protection of
those interests, industrialized nations which mutually depend upon the security of air traffic
can likewise justify collective self-help to protect that interest. See generally Meeker, Defensive Quarantine and the Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 515 (1963), for an analysis and justification
of regional response to situations that endanger regional peace.
177. Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 545, 547-48 (1963).
178. Id. at 548.
179. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 1681,
T.I.A.S. No. 1838, reprintedin H. DE VRIES & J. RODRIQUEZ-NOVAS, THE LAW OF THE
AMERICAS (1965) [hereinafter cited as Rio Treaty]. See also Kunz, The Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 111 (1948).
180. Meeker, supra note 176, at 519. Among the signatories to the treaty are Cuba and
the United States. U.N. CHARTER, reprintedin [1946-1947] U.N.Y.B. 831, and every volume
of U.N.Y.B. seriatim.
181. The Rio Treaty, in part, provides for collective action:
If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political
independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is
not an armed attack . . or by any otherfact or situation that might endanger the
peace of America . . . [foreign ministers of the Member States will] meet immediately in order to agree on the measures which must be taken in case of aggression to
assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measure which should be
taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of
the Continent.
Rio Treaty, supra note 179, art. 6 (emphasis added). The sanction provision states:
For the purposes of this Treaty, the measures on which the [foreign ministers of the
Member States] may agree will comprise one or more of the following: recall of
chiefs of diplomatic mission; breaking of diplomatic relations; breaking of consular
relations; partial or complete interruption of economic relations or of rail, sea, air,
postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and radiophonic communications; and the use of
armed force.
1d. art. 8.
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the United Nations Charter, which provides that regional agencies
may take security action to maintain international peace. 18 2 Assuming Soviet and Cuban actions constituted a threat to international peace and security, the83 defensive blockade by the United
States was a lawful response.'
Harboring skyjackers is a threat to international security, because it encourages the commission of the offense.' 8 4 If the Cuban
quarantine can be considered an appropriate means to compel the
removal of nuclear missiles, then an aircraft boycott can be considered an appropriate means to bring about the elimination of sanctuaries for skyjackers.' 8 5 The effective employment of those means,
however, is dependent upon the number of nations that will undertake enforcement measures.
B.

Willingness of Nations to Enforce the
Bonn Declaration'sSanctions

In the event a state refuses to adequately punish or extradite
an apprehended skyjacker, sanctions must be imposed. This should
involve multilateral action; collective application of sanctions
have
86
more impact than action taken by individual states.'
Presently, the probability of this response is doubtful, because
the detrimental economic consequences of an aircraft boycott
would affect the boycotting states as well as the recalcitrant
states.' 8 7 The willingness of states to impose sanctions upon other
states is a function of relative economic detriment; 88 unless a state
182. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that
such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes
and Principles of the United Nations.
U.N. CHARTER art. 52, para. 1.

183. Meeker, supra note 176, at 519.
184. See Whiteman, supra note 3, at 625.
185. A successful international skyjacking is defined as one in which "an aircraft is diverted to a foreign destination from its scheduled domestic or foreign destination . ... "
Evans, supra note 9, at 641-42. If there were no possible "destinations," that is, no nations
where a skyjacker would benefit from landing, there would not be a possibility of a meaningful success.
186.

AGRAWALA, supra note 30, at 136.

187. Id.; see note 133 supra.
188. [Einforcement depends upon the willingness of the states. This willingness is
born out of necessity, compulsion [, or both]. [The] U.S.A. has been the most ardent supporter of stringent measures against hijackers since the beginning because
more U.S. aircrafts have been hijacked to date than of all other states put together.
The Soviet Union joined hands with [the] U.S.A. only after the hijacking of Soviet
planes. Japan ratified the Tokyo Convention only after its plane was hijacked in
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significantly suffers from acts of skyjacking, it is unlikely to act in a
manner that would ultimately cause more damage to itself than the
damage sustained from incidents of skyjacking. The coordinated
international response necessary to enforce effectively the Bonn
Declaration sanctions will not be possible unless conditions exist
that make enforcement of the Declaration an economic necessity.' 89 Assuming such conditions will arise, the question then becomes whether enforcement of Declaration sanctions can succeed
in deterring illegal seizures of aircraft.
C. Preconditionsforthe Meaningful Imposition of Sanctions
If the imposition of sanctions upon states is to be meaningful,
there must be certainty, at the national level, of severe legal consequences for acts of skyjacking. This could be accomplished by instituting mandatory extradition provisions, rigorous sentencing of
offenders, or both. Mandatory extradition would compel the limiting of the political offense and the political refugee exceptions; if
only the political offense exception were limited, countries sympathetic to terrorists would be able to refuse extradition using the political refugee criteria. 9 °
The institution of effective sentencing would significantly
avoid the problems that flow from conflicting views of extradition.
Because skyjacking is recognized as an offense against international
public order, 9 ' it is reasonable that the criminal punishment of the
offense be to the satisfaction of all states, rather than merely those
prosecuting the offense.' 9 2 Although this solution would interfere
with the judicial discretion of the prosecuting state, it would be less
of an affront to that state's sovereignty than would be mandatory
extradition, which would force a government to remove a person
from its jurisdiction. 93 Moreover, assuming that a multilateral
agreement can be reached defining what constitutes an effective
"severe" penalty, the issues of sovereignty and judicial discretion
1970. . . . The ratifications of the Hague Convention to date [do not include] the
problem states of the Middle East, the Caribbean and the Mediterranean. Though
some of the hijackings have been from such states too, but they have been relatively
too few to outweigh the political compulsion of these states which encourage rather
than deter and punish acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation.
AGRAWALA, supra note 30, at 137.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 133.
191. See Whiteman supra note 3, at 625.
192. See text accompanying note 173 supra.
193. See SCHWARZENBERGER & BROWN, supra note 25, at 51-54.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol10/iss1/6

28

Fingerman: Skyjacking
and the AND
BonnTHE
Declaration
of 1978: Sanctions Applicable
SKYJACKING
BONN DECLARATION

will be rendered moot for nations that regard their treaty obligations as supreme national law.' 94
VI.

CONCLUSION

Despite international measures of deterrence, skyjacking continues to be a considerable burden upon civil aviation and public
order, largely due to the leniency of certain states.' 95 The Bonn
Declaration on Hijacking is a recognition of this situation in that it
relates to international terrorism and is the first international agreement calling for the use of aircraft boycotts to force recalcitrant
nations to deal firmly with skyjackers.' 9 6 There are several factors,
however, that will hinder the Declaration's effectiveness.
While the Bonn Declaration goes beyond existing international agreements by requiring prosecution of alleged skyjackers
where extradition is denied,' 9 7 it is unlikely to have much impact
on current state practice,' 98 because perfunctory prosecution resulting in token sentences complies with that mandate.' 99 Nations, for
economic and ideological reasons, differ regarding what constitutes
a suitable penalty for the offense - sentencing policies and practices vary accordingly.2"0 The more lenient practices derive from
political exceptions,2"' which pose a major, unresolved obstacle to
the implementation of tough, mandatory sentencing standards.
So long as potential skyjackers can rely on light sentences from
sympathetic states, they will continue to believe that the benefits of
skyjacking outweigh the legal consequences. 20 2 As international
terrorists continue to employ skyjacking, the world community will
have to decide a difficult question - whether the "Pandora's box"
194. Id. at 123.
195. See notes 48-49 & 98 supra.
196. The likely effect of a Bonn Declaration-type sanction has been summed up elsewhere, but note should be taken of the central importance of applicationand enforcement of
these sanctions, as discussed in this Comment:
Suspending all commercial air service to any state granting safe haven to skyjackers, disregarding any political motives, would be an effective deterrent at minimal
cost with maximum effect. It would serve notice on members of the world community that sheltering skyjackers and their accomplices is a tortious act, the remedy for
which is a universally applied, collectively enforced economic sanction.
FRIEDLANDER, supra note 47, at 121 (emphasis added).

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

See
See
See
See
See
See

note 149 supra.
note 49 supra.
text accompanying note 151 supra.
note 120 supra.
notes 38-84 supra.
note 99 supra, and accompanying text.
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of political exceptions is worth keeping open for the benefit of a few
people.2 °3
If the safety of international civil aviation is considered to be a
normative international standard ('us cogens),2 °4 there can be no
exceptions to the imposition of criminal liability for skyjacking,
even where the skyjacking is politically motivated. 20 5 In addition,
nations that harbor skyjackers also violatejus cogens and are vulnerable to retribution from injured nations, regardless of the nonexistence of applicable, binding treaties. 20 6 The effectiveness of retribution, such as an aircraft boycott, is dependent upon collective
action by many nations.20 7 Ultimately, however, cooperative international action is dependent upon economics; effective, joint international efforts to deter states from harboring skyjackers will not be
implemented until skyjacking becomes economically intolerable.20 8
Mark E Fingerman

203. This follows from the view that:
As long as even one safe haven remains, as long as the political offense exception
. . . is still applied to ideologically motivated offenders, and as long as political
considerations take precedence over the public's absolute right to safe passage under
any andall conditions, fear will continue to ride the skies as an unwelcome companion for air travellers everywhere.
FRIEDLANDER, supra note 47, at 140-41 (emphasis added).

204. See Whiteman, supra note 3.
205. See Vienna Convention, supra note 26, art. 53, and text accompanying note 165
supra.

206. See Abramovsky (pt. 3), supra note 4, at 483.
207.

See AGRAWALA, supra note 30, at 136.

208. Id. at 137.
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